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Causation and Misconnections
Phil Dowe†
In this paper I show how the conserved quantity theory, or more generally the process
theory of Wesley Salmon and myself, provides a sufficient condition in an analysis of
causation. To do so I will show how it handles the problem of alleged ‘misconnections’.
I show what the conserved quantity theory says about such cases, and why intuitions
are not to be taken as sacrosanct.
1. Introduction. I wish to deal with a specific objection to the process
theory of causation as articulated by Wes Salmon (1997, 1998) and myself.
By ‘process theory’ I mean an account of causation that takes causal
processes and interactions as more fundamental than causal relations. To
express this, Salmon liked to quote John Venn’s words to the effect that
our thinking about causation would benefit from replacing the metaphor
of the chain of causation with one of a rope of causation. On the process
theory, then, any truths about causation as a relation between events are
true only on account of more basic facts about causal processes and
interactions. The alternative is to treat causal relations as more basic, and
then to define processes as chains of causal relations (e.g., David Lewis
1986).
Take Salmon’s version of the conserved quantity theory:1
A causal interaction is an intersection of world-lines that involves
exchange of a conserved quantity. . . .
A causal process is the world-line of an object that transmits a non-
zero amount of a conserved quantity at each moment of its history
(each spacetime point of its trajectory). (Salmon 1997, 468)
The concept of transmission is to be understood by the following defi-
nition:
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1. The same arguments will apply to my version given in Dowe 1992, 2000.
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A process transmits a conserved quantity between A and B (A(
) if and only if it possesses [a fixed amount of] this quantity at AB
and at B and at every stage of the process between A and B without
any interactions in the open interval (A, B) that involve an exchange
of that particular conserved quantity. (Salmon 1997, 462)
Further, we can think of the relata of causal relations as facts, events, or
whatever involving an object possessing a conserved quantity. Causal
relations hold between such events or facts only if there is a set of causal
processes and interactions connecting them. The process theory is there-
fore localist, meaning that facts about causation obtain in virtue of actual
local features of the world.
The process theory is offered as an empirical analysis, meaning that it
concerns an objective feature of the actual world and that it draws its
primary justification from our best scientific theories. Empirical analysis
is to be contrasted with conceptual analysis, the approach that says in
offering a theory of causation we seek to give an account of the concept
as revealed in the way we (i.e., folk) think and speak. Conceptual analysis
respects as primary data intuitions about causation; empirical analysis
has no such commitment (Dowe 2000, ch. 1).
2. The Problem of Misconnections. The problem of misconnections is that
there are cases which our clear intuitions say are not cases of causation,
but which, according to the process theory, are cases of causation. It is
then argued on the basis of such cases that the process theory does not
provide a sufficient condition for causation (Ehring 2003). We will consider
two cases.
Case 1. Irrelevance.—Suppose someone takes a photo of a game of
billiards, such that just as the white and black balls collide, the flash
illuminates the balls. The black ball continues on into the pocket as a
result of the collision. Intuitively, the white ball striking it causes the black
ball to sink, but the flash illuminating the collision does not. It is causally
irrelevant. However, there is a set of causal processes and interactions
connecting the taking of the photo with the ball sinking, so on the process
theory it counts as a cause. This is because there is a small exchange of
energy between the light and the black ball as it is struck by the white
ball, so the light is part of the causal interaction.
Case 2. Negative relevance.—John turns on the heater. Jane comes into
the room and opens the window. Subsequently the room is colder than
it was before. Intuitively, John’s turning on the heater doesn’t cause the
room to be colder; on the contrary, it is negatively relevant. However,
since there is a set of causal processes and interactions linking John’s
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turning on the heater to the room being colder later, the process theory
entails that it is a cause.
Thus, the objection goes, we need a more restrictive account of causal
relevance than that provided by the process theory. I have provided an
answer to this objection (Dowe 2000, ch. 7). However, in a conversation
with the late Wes Salmon, another answer came to light which I wish to
outline in this paper. First, however, we need to discuss the dangers of
appealing to intuitions.
3. Intuition Dangers. As mentioned above, conceptual analysis—of the
concept as revealed in the way we (i.e., folk) think and speak—relies on
as primary data intuitions about causation. It requires that the analysis
should yield the same answer any competent user of the language would
give about particular cases. If our intuitions say such and such is a clear
case of causation, then as far as is possible the theory should also give
that result. In actual practice it’s the “clear” intuitions of philosophers
that form the relevant data. I have three problems with this methodology.
1. The method as practiced is untested for reliability. Are the intuitions
of philosophers a reliable guide to folk concepts? Nobody knows;
it’s a claim that needs testing. My anecdotal evidence is that phi-
losophers routinely disagree about what is taken as “clear intuitions
of the folk.” And are the intuitions of philosophers biased by phil-
osophical commitments? Again, this needs testing. My anecdotal
evidence is that philosophers’ “clear intuitions” tend to be associated
with our own theories.
2. The methodology encourages far-fetched examples because the anal-
ysis if true is taken to be a conceptual truth. For example, we often
read something like: “Take a world with very different laws. Would
we say intuitively that x is a case of causation?” Such worlds might
be inhabited by gods or demons, or they might contain virtually
nothing. But not only are such ‘intuitions’ as might be mustered
meaningless for empirical analysis, given that such worlds are so
removed from common sense. they also seem suspect as data for a
mapping of a concept in any actual culture. (This problem doesn’t
apply to the cases under consideration in this paper.)
3. I also worry that folk intuitions about causation are biased towards
specific human interests such as responsibility. Such interests are not
specifically part of the concept of causation itself.
There is long standing tradition which deals with problem 3. Take J. S.
Mill. On the Millian tradition a scientific theory of causes tells us that
all partial causes are relevant: together they make up the total cause. Any
partial cause could be treated as a ‘cause’ in virtue of the fact that it is
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part of the scientific cause, but our everyday intuition of ‘the cause’ which
tends to select one partial cause over others, does so because of human
interests and is of no relevance to a scientific account. For example,
intuitively the striking of the match is the cause of the explosion, but not
the presence of oxygen. We make this mistake because striking the match
is something which we have more control over and are likely to be held
responsible for. The tradition then tends to relegate consideration of such
interests to so-called ‘pragmatics’.
Another aspect is transitivity. A mother sends her son to buy milk at
the shop, but he steals some chocolate. By transitivity, since her sending
him to the shop caused him to be in the shop where he had the temptation,
which in turn caused him to steal, she therefore caused his stealing, albeit
counterintuitively. Since causation is transitive (according to most theo-
rists of causation), but intuitively she doesn’t cause him to steal even
though she caused him to go to the shop, the tradition deals with this by
relegating such considerations to ‘pragmatics’. Typically we think of
longer chains as not causation even though they are, because they are
less within our control. Thus in law there is usually a ‘break’ before the
chain is traced back too far, even though the definition of causation
utilized in law—sine non qua—is transitive. The same treatment can be
given for cases like “the big bang caused today’s rain.”
Thus we have a tradition which relegates counterintuitive cases to prag-
matics, a tradition well accepted because most theorists of causation take
causation to be transitive and deny special status to any partial cause.
With this general discussion of the dangers of intuitions in place, we now
turn to specific answers to the examples of alleged misconnections.
4. Irrelevance. The objection we outlined in Section 2 notes that the pro-
cess theory takes intuitively irrelevant factors as causes. Intuitively, the
flash illuminating the collision did not cause the black ball to sink, but
there is a set of causal processes and interactions (as defined by the con-
served quantity theory) connecting the flash with the ball sinking.
There are two possible cases. First, if the incident light makes no dif-
ference to the momenta of the balls, where ‘difference’ is understood in
terms of the application of the conservation law to the interaction, then
indeed the flash is not a cause, as we would think intuitively. But second,
if the light makes a small, even “negligible” difference to the momenta
of the balls, then it is indeed a cause on the conserved quantity theory.
That this is counterintuitive can be handled straightforwardly in line
with the Mill tradition on partial causes. On the conserved quantity theory,
all contributions count as causes, however small. It is not necessary for
the theory to explain why we intuitively count some partial causes as
causes and not others, but the ‘pragmatics’ no doubt will tell us to ignore
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negligible contributions. (It may be objected that the reason we don’t
count the light as a partial cause is that the ball would have sunk all the
same without it. We deal with this kind of objection in the next section.)
5. Negative Relevance. John turns on the heater (event x). Jane comes
into the room and opens the window (event y). Subsequently the room
is colder than it was before x (event z). Counterintuitively, there is a set
of causal processes and interactions linking x to z.
First, we need to expand a little on the conserved quantity theory.
Causal events or facts involve just the actual obtaining of local quanti-
tative properties (Dowe 2000, ch. 7). The description “is colder than be-
fore” is disjunctive—there is a very large range of possible room tem-
peratures that fit this description. If our causal events—in this case the
effect—involve just the actual obtaining of local quantitative properties
then we need to redescribe the effect in terms of just the actual room
temperature at that time, let’s say 4 degrees C (call this event z*). Thus
we must say that the process theory says that x causes z* (rather than z).
Second, z* has partial causes x and y. Put this way, all theories of
causation would be in agreement. For example, z* depends counterfac-
tually on both x and y. And put this way, we can see why our interests
(intentions, remoteness, etc.) would lead us to focus on y and not x.
And third, this example is like a standard counterexample to transitivity
(granting that Jane opens the window in effect because the heater was
on). As Lewis (2000) puts it, Red acts for an end, leading Black to counter
successfully. Does Red cause that success? Lewis sees no option but to
abandon the intuition and go with transitivity. We do too. Such intuitions
can be explained by ‘pragmatics’.
Finally, to see why we can be comfortable disregarding intuitions, con-
sider what folk intuitions might be about the following two claims. (1)
Turning on the heater caused the room to get colder. (2) Turning on the
heater (together with other factors) caused the room to be 4 degrees C
an hour later. I submit that intuitions would be (1) No; (2) Yes. This
illustrates how sensitive our intuitions are to which factors are focussed
on. But the causal story remains the same, and the difference is well
explained by pragmatics. This connection is not a misconnection.
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